The giant sucking sound: did NAFTA devour the Mexican peso? by Christopher J. Neely
 
1 See Hufbauer and Schott
(1993), Aguilar (1993), or
Tornell and Esquivel (1995)
for more discussion of NAFTA’s
provisions.
 





This article examines the relationship
between NAFTA and the peso crisis of 
December 1994. First, the provisions of
NAFTA are reviewed, and then the links
between NAFTA and the peso crisis are
examined. Despite a blizzard of innuendo
and intimation that there was an obvious
link between the passage of NAFTA and
the peso devaluation, NAFTA’s critics
have not been clear as to what the link
actually was. Examination of their argu-
ments and economic theory suggests two
possibilities: that NAFTA caused the Mex-
ican authorities to manipulate and prop
up the value of the peso for political rea-
sons or that NAFTA’s implementation
caused capital ﬂows that brought the
peso down. Each hypothesis is investi-
gated in turn.
NAFTA
NAFTA grew out of the U.S.–Canadian
Free Trade Agreement of 1988.1 It was
signed by Mexico, Canada, and the United
States on December 17, 1992. The legisla-
tures of those countries ratiﬁed NAFTA,
and the agreement took effect on January
1, 1994. The treaty substantially lowered
national barriers to trade and investment
in North America, giving consumers more
choices and lower prices. In addition, the
changes began to lower the cost of produc-
tion and to funnel investment and labor to
their most productive uses. Not surpris-
ingly, the costs—real and imagined—of
this reallocation of resources stirred the
passions of those opposing the agreement.
The trade provisions of NAFTA were
designed to reduce tariffs and nontariff
barriers—such as quotas and import 
licensing—radically over 15 years. Some
tariffs were reduced immediately, whereas
other reductions will be phased in over a
period of 10 years—15 years for certain
sensitive sectors, such as agriculture and
textiles and apparel.
 









t the end of 1993 Mexico was touted
as a model for developing countries.
Five years of prudent ﬁscal and mone-
tary policy had dramatically lowered its
budget deﬁcit and inﬂation rate and the
government had privatized many enter-
prises that were formerly state-owned. To
culminate this progress, Mexico was
preparing to enter into the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with
Canada and the United States. But less than
a year later, in December 1994, investors
sold their peso assets, the value of the Mex-
ican peso plunged 50 percent against the
U.S. Dollar, and Mexico was forced to bor-
row from the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) and the United States to get through
a ﬁnancial crisis. In 1995, inﬂation in Mex-
ico soared to 50 percent and real gross do-
mestic product (GDP) fell by 4 percent.
Politicians and commentators like Ross
Perot, Pat Buchanan, William Greider, and
Robert Kuttner blamed the enactment of
NAFTA for the devaluation of the peso and
the ensuing economic turmoil in Mexico,
with some calling for its renegotiation or
even repeal. As the members of NAFTA
consider expanding to encompass other
Latin American nations, such as Chile, in-
vestors and policymakers should under-
stand the link between NAFTA and the
peso crisis well. Did NAFTA cause or exac-
erbate the devaluation of the peso? Or did
NAFTA help alleviate some of the conse-
quences of the crisis?JULY/AUGUST 1996
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For the United States and Mexico, the
trade provisions of NAFTA are expected to
have their most important effects on the
automobile, textile and apparel, and agri-
cultural sectors. In agriculture, U.S. and
Mexican quotas were immediately con-
verted into equivalent tariffs and those 
tariffs will be phased out over 10 to 15
years. As Hufbauer and Schott (1993) 
note, this is a remarkable achievement
given the difﬁculties encountered by 
other free trade agreements on agricul-
tural issues.
Given the ﬁerce ﬁght in the United
States over the agreement, it is ironic that
NAFTA required more substantial changes
in Mexican law—both trade and invest-
ment law—than it did in U.S. law. Average
U.S. tariff levels on Mexican goods were
already quite low—just four percent—on a
value-weighted basis, before the introduc-
tion of NAFTA.
2 Mexican tariffs were
higher, averaging 10 percent on imports
from the United States. Through NAFTA,
Mexico also committed itself to address
other long-standing U.S. concerns, like the
protection of intellectual property rights
and reform of Mexico’s regulation of for-
eign investment.
NAFTA was the culmination of a sig-
niﬁcant break with Mexico’s protectionist
past.
3 Until the 1970s, Mexico followed a
policy of import substitution industrializa-
tion that mandated highly protected mar-
kets for manufactured goods. In that
decade, preliminary reforms in the direc-
tion of freer trade were taken. The debt 
crisis of 1982 reversed that trend; for a
short period in 1982–1983, Mexico was
one of the most protected economies in 
the world. During the de la Madrid admin-
istration (1982–88), Mexico took impor-
tant steps to move toward more liberal
trade. Mexico lowered tariffs and joined
the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT) in 1986.4 Mexico took fur-
ther unilateral steps toward free trade as
part of the Salinas administration’s
(1988–94) program of economic reform.




Despite the impressive achievements
of the negotiators in crafting such a far-
reaching trade agreement, NAFTA’s direct
economic beneﬁt to the United States will
likely be small. One representative esti-
mate of NAFTA’s annual beneﬁts to Mex-
ico and the United States arrives at ap-
proximately the same ﬁgure for each
country;
5 however, this amounts to about
0.3 percent of 1993 U.S. GDP but more
than 5.0 percent of Mexico’s output. Schott
(1994), Tornell and Esquivel (1995) and
others have argued that the most impor-
tant aspect of NAFTA’s passage for the
Mexican economy is that it would cement
the other economic reforms in place. Krug-
man (1993) and Orme (1993) both contend
that NAFTA is most important to the United
States as a tool of foreign policy, to encour-
age Mexican economic and political reform.
NAFTA AND THE VALUE 
OF THE PESO
This section lays out the case that the
peso was kept overvalued because of the pol-
itics of NAFTA and then investigates whether
this argument is consistent with the facts.
 
The Case That the Peso’s Value 
Was Artiﬁcially Inﬂated Because 
of the Politics of NAFTA
The most common hypothesis linking
NAFTA to the peso crisis is that the politics
of NAFTA caused the Bank of Mexico to
systematically manipulate the value of the
peso to increase support for the treaty, both
before NAFTA was passed in the United
States and during its ﬁrst year. There are
two versions of this hypothesis. The ﬁrst
version suggests that the value of the peso
was deliberately manipulated to secure po-
litical support for NAFTA and that the de-
valuation—to obtain a trade advantage—
was planned well in advance. The second
version is less sinister. It suggests only that
the Mexican authorities were sensitive to
U.S. politics in setting exchange rate policy
after NAFTA was passed. The following sec-
tions lay out the arguments behind each
version of this hypothesis.
2 See Tornell and Esquivel
(1995).  Changes in value-
weighted tariff schedules can
be misleading, however, be-
cause there are also some
quantitative restrictions. 
3 See Kehoe (1995) for a re-
view of Mexico’s recent trade
history.
4 The GATT was an international
organization to negotiate free
trade among its members. It
has been superseded by the
World Trade Organization
(WTO). 
5 Krugman (1993) and Brown,
Deardorf and Stern (1992) dis-
cuss estimates of the gains
from NAFTA.JULY/AUGUST 1996
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Deliberate Manipulation and Planned 
Devaluation.
“... the devaluation of the peso
had been planned for more than a
year and was openly discussed at
the highest levels of the Mexican
government. It was also widely
known in Washington. I discussed
it in my testimony before the
House Committee on Small Busi-
ness in March, 1993—eight
months before the North Ameri-
can Free Trade Agreement was
passed into law.” 
Ross Perot, Los Angeles Times, 
January 4, 1995.
6
Critics like Ross Perot argue that the
Mexican government and the Bank of Mex-
ico kept the value of the peso artiﬁcially
high to increase political support for the
treaty in the United States by creating a bi-
lateral trade surplus with Mexico. The
United States did have a trade surplus with
Mexico in the early 1990s. A study by 
Hufbauer and Schott (1993) was frequently
cited by NAFTA proponents to support the
questionable notion that the growthof this
trade surplus would create 170,000 jobs in
the United States. The Clinton administra-
tion used these arguments to sell NAFTA to
the U.S. Congress primarily as a jobs pro-
gram, rather than as a trade agreement that
would promote greater choice and lower
prices for consumers and greater efﬁciency
in production.
“We will make our case as hard 
and as well as we can. And, though 
the ﬁght will be difﬁcult, I deeply 
believe we will win. And I’d like 
to tell you why. First of all, because 
NAFTA means jobs. American jobs,
and good-paying American jobs. If I
didn’t believe that, I wouldn’t sup-
port this agreement.” 
President Bill Clinton at the signing
of NAFTA Side Agreements on 
September 14, 1993.
President Clinton even talked about
leaving NAFTA after three years if a review
of the evidence at that time suggested that
the treaty had cost American jobs. So there
was considerable pressure to produce evi-
dence that showed that NAFTA would cre-
ate jobs in the United States.
The Mexican government was not im-
mune to such pressure. In 1993, passage
of NAFTA by the U.S. Congress was the
main policy concern of the Mexican ad-
ministration [see Tornell and Esquivel
(1995)]. In August of that year, President
Salinas even promised to raise the Mexican
minimum wage to alleviate U.S. fears of
cheap Mexican labor driving down U.S.
wages and taking jobs. Critics charge that
because of such political considerations,
the Mexican government deliberately kept
the peso overvalued throughout 1993 and
1994 and planned the eventual devalua-
tion well in advance.
Sensitivity to U.S. Politics. A more rea-
sonable hypothesis is put forward by Ve-
lasco (1995) and others. They suggest
only that, after NAFTA was passed, the
Mexican authorities were sensitive to the
U.S. political situation and may therefore
have been more reluctant to permit the
peso to depreciate than they would other-
wise have been. Speciﬁcally, in March
1994, the peso came under speculative
pressure in the wake of the assassination
of Luis Donaldo Colosio, presidential can-
didate of the ruling Revolutionary Institu-
tional Party (PRI). At that time, a number
of observers warned that the peso was
overvalued and that a faster devaluation
was warranted. Velasco suggests that be-
cause such a course of action threatened to
create political problems with the United
States, political exigencies may have pre-
vented an earlier, milder correction to the
value of the peso that would have avoided
the drastic correction of the later crisis.
Evaluating the Case that the Peso’s
Value was Artiﬁcially Inﬂated 
Because of the Politics of NAFTA
Critics argue that NAFTA provided the
impetus for the Mexican monetary author-
ities to maintain the value of the peso in
6 See also, columnist Robert
Kuttner, January 22, 1995, 
in the Akron Beacon Journal
and author William Greider in
Rolling Stone, March 9, 1995.excess of its equilibrium value. The au-
thorities allegedly knew that the peso was
overvalued but gambled that this overvalu-
ation could be maintained long enough to
secure NAFTA’s passage in the United
States. Thus, this hypothesis requires that:
1. The peso was overvalued.
2. The Mexican authorities knew that it
was overvalued.
3. The Mexican authorities kept it overval-
ued to increase or at least maintain sup-
port for NAFTA in the United States.
Although it is not possible to test the ele-
ments of this hypothesis, they may be ex-
amined to see whether they are consistent
with the facts. This section argues that
though the evidence favors the view that
the peso was overvalued, this was not obvi-
ous at the time. Further, to the extent that
the peso may have been overvalued, the
overvaluation was a result of the disinﬂa-
tion strategy of the Mexican authorities,
rather than a result of NAFTA.
Nominal and Real Exchange Rates. When
discussing the value of the peso, it is im-
portant to distinguish between the nominal
exchange rate, or the price of a peso in
terms of dollars, and the real exchange
rate, the price of Mexican goods in terms
of U.S. goods. This section explains the re-
lationship between prices and exchange
rates and why the real exchange rate is the
relevant measure of the proper value of the
peso.
Exchange rates and prices are linked
through the law of one price, which says that
identical goods should sell for the same
price when expressed in terms of the same
currency.







oil (t) ´ e(t),
where the variable p
U.S.
oil (t) is the price of oil
in dollars in the United States at time t,
p
MEX
oil (t) is the price of oil in pesos in Mex-
ico at time t, and e(t) is the exchange rate
in dollars per peso. In other words, if a
barrel of oil costs $20 in the United States
and 80 pesos in Mexico, the law of one
price predicts the nominal exchange rate
will be $0.25 per peso. This condition
must approximately hold, or people could
make money by buying oil in the country
where it is cheap and selling it in the
country where it is expensive. Such arbi-
trage would tend to drive the price of oil
down in the country where it is expensive
and raise the price in the country where it
is cheap, until the law of one price ap-
proximately holds.
If the law of one price holds for 
each good in a price index and the
weights in the price index are the same
for each country, then consumption bas-
kets should also sell for the same price
when expressed in the same currency.
This is called absolute purchasing power









Index(t) is a measure of the price
level in the United States and p
MEX
Index(t) is the
analogous measure for Mexico. Of course,
because of different patterns of consump-
tion across countries, the presence of non-
traded goods and differentiated goods, ab-
solute PPP does not describe the relation of
price levels and exchange rates very well.
A less stringent, but more realistic re-
lation is relative PPP. It says that differ-
ences in countries’ inﬂation rates should











where D stands for the percentage change in
a variable over time. This equation says that
if inﬂation in Mexico exceeds inﬂation in
the United States, the exchange rate will fall
to reﬂect the difference. That is, the peso
will depreciate. Why? If Mexican goods be-
come more expensive than U.S. goods, con-
sumers in both the United States and Mex-
ico will tend to buy more U.S. goods. This
will cause the peso to depreciate until Mexi-
can goods are competitive again.
7 Barriers to trade, transportation
costs, and imperfectly competi-
tive markets may prevent the
law of one price from holding.
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says that the real exchange rate, or the
price of Mexican goods in terms of U.S.
goods, should be constant over time. At
time t, the real exchange rate (q(t)) can be
expressed as follows:
q(t) = .
For practical purposes, however, relative
PPP is interpreted to mean that the real
exchange rate should tend to come back to
its historical average rather than be con-
stant over time. Empirical studies suggest
that this interpretation of relative PPP is
useful for thinking about long-run tenden-
cies in exchange rates, especially when in-
ﬂation rates are high.
Why is the real exchange rate impor-
tant? A currency has value only because of
what it can purchase. The real exchange
rate adjusts the nominal value of a cur-
rency for its purchasing power and so de-
termines competitiveness in world mar-
kets. For example, a rise in the real
exchange rate (as deﬁned previously)
means that the price of Mexican goods in
terms of U.S. goods has risen. The price of
Mexican exports to the United States rises,
hurting Mexican exporters, but imports
from the United States become cheaper to
Mexican consumers. Therefore the rele-
vant measure of the value of the peso is
the value of the real exchange rate.
Was the Peso Overvalued?Armed with the
concept of the real exchange rate, it is still
difﬁcult to determine whether the peso was
correctly valued because the real exchange
rate changes over time. In the case of a
pegged exchange rate system like Mexico’s,
a real exchange rate is functionally overval-
ued or undervalued if the nominal exchange
rate is likely to be forced to change quickly.
That is, the real exchange rate should be
compatible with the commitment to the
pegged nominal exchange rate.
Relative PPP suggests a practical mea-
sure of whether the current real exchange
rate is likely to be consistent with the peg:
whether it is in line with historical values
of the real exchange rate. If the Mexican
inﬂation rate minus the U.S. inﬂation rate











—then the real exchange rate rises and
Mexican goods became more expensive in
terms of U.S. goods; the peso becomes
overvalued. Historical measures of the cor-
rect value of the real exchange rate are im-
perfect, though. The proper value of the
real exchange rate can change over time
because of changes in productivity, prefer-
ences, legal capital controls, or other fac-
tors. These changes are usually slow, how-
ever, leaving historical measures useful.
Respected economists like Dornbusch
and Werner (1994) argued during 1993
and 1994 that the peso was overvalued be-
cause an index of the real exchange rate,
as measured by the Wholesale Price Index
(WPI), was high by historical standards.
As illustrated in Figure 1, this index rose
steadily from a level of 70 in 1987 to a
peak of about 130 at the end of 1993. By
this measure, Mexican goods had become
almost twice as expensive in terms of U.S.
goods from 1987 through 1993 and the
real value of the peso was 30 percent
higher than its historical average from
1975 through 1993. Dornbusch and
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Figure 1
Index of the Real Exchange Rate (WPI)
Year







Mean = 100this situation was untenable and the 
peso should be permitted to depreciate
faster.
The hypothesis that the Mexican au-
thorities deliberately manipulated the
value of the peso requires that these au-
thorities knew the peso was overvalued.
Did they know this? In responding to
Dornbusch and Werner, economists at the
Bank of Mexico contended that the real
exchange rate was not overvalued for sev-
eral reasons. First, another measure of the
real exchange rate—using unit labor costs
instead of price indices—did not show the
peso to be overvalued. Gil-Diaz and
Carstens (1995) argue that unit labor costs
are a better way to compute real exchange
rates because they more closely reﬂect the
relative cost of production in Mexico and
abroad. Further, the real value of the peso
for Mexico’s trade depended not only on
its value vs. the dollar, but also on its
value vs. Mexico’s other trading partners,
and therefore they suggest that multilateral
measure of the real exchange rate is more
appropriate. Figure 2 shows that, by the
beginning of 1994, the multilateral effec-
tive real exchange rate index, as measured
by unit labor costs, had also risen substan-
tially—about 60 percent—since 1987 but
was still as low as it had ever been before
1986.
8 In fact, it was still slightly below its
historical average for the period 1975–94.
Thus Gil-Diaz and Carstens argued that
this historical measure did not show the
real exchange rate to be overvalued.
Second, because the proper value of
the real exchange rate can change over
time because of productivity changes 
and other factors, the Mexican authorities
disagreed with Dornbusch and Werner
about the relevance of historical mea-
sures. They asserted that NAFTA and
other economic reforms had raised pro-
ductivity and had increased the correct
(equilibrium) value of the real exchange
rate; that is, the equilibrium price of
Mexican goods had risen.
“The Mexicans were justiﬁably
proud of the progress they had
made in bringing down inﬂation,
by means of the exchange rate
link to the dollar, and did not
want to lose it. I suspect they
thought they were in a new world,
as a result of the economic liberal-
ization and NAFTA.” 
Economist Jeffrey Frankel, 
Statement to the U.S. Senate Com-
mittee on Banking, Housing and
Urban Affairs, March 9, 1995.
Also, there was very little pressure on
the peso before March 1994, indicating
that the markets did not believe that the
peso was overvalued. In fact, the Bank of
8 Data for the multilateral real
exchange rate were taken from
Gil-Diaz and Carstens (1995).
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Billions of U.  S.  DollarsMexico had to intervene in the market to
sell pesos/buy dollars to keep the value of
the peso down in January 1994, accumu-
lating foreign exchange reserves. Figure 3
shows this accumulation as the spike up-
wards in foreign exchange reserves at the
beginning of 1994.
Finally, a fundamental measure of
whether the real exchange rate is properly
valued is its effect on exports. The Mexi-
can government questioned how the real
exchange rate could be overvalued when
export growth was as strong as it was. Cu-
mulative nonoil export growth from 1985
to 1994 was more than 200 percent, in 
the same range as such export powers as
Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan.
9
To summarize: Dornbusch and Werner
presented evidence that the real exchange
rate, as measured by the WPI, was overval-
ued in 1993 and 1994. Although in retro-
spect it looks as if Dornbusch and Werner
were correct, this was not obvious at the
time. Other measures of the exchange rate
showed no overvaluation, economic re-
form had likely made historical measures
less reliable than usual, and export growth
was strong.
Disinﬂation and the Overvalued Peso.In
1993 and 1994 many economists who sup-
ported NAFTA warned that the real ex-
change rate had become overvalued and
could lead to a crisis.
10These economists ar-
gued that the peso had become overvalued
because Mexican ofﬁcials had used the
pegged exchange rate to help bring inﬂation
down (see Table 1) from 159 percent in
1987 to 8.0 percent in 1993. This section ex-
plains the role of a pegged exchange rate in
bringing down inﬂation and the dangers of
such a policy.
To understand how the value of the
peso affects inﬂation, consider how mone-
tary policy, exchange rates, and prices in-
teract. Because only the Bank of Mexico,
Mexico’s central bank, can issue peso cur-
rency or reserves, within very broad limits,
it can control the value of the peso by con-
trolling the supply of pesos. Similarly, the
Bank of Mexico also controls Mexican in-
ﬂation by increasing or decreasing the
growth of the money supply. No central
bank, however, can independently control
both the exchange rate and inﬂation at 
the same time. The desired inﬂation rate
may not be compatible with the preferred
exchange rate. That is, if a central bank
picks a level of inﬂation to target, it must
choose the particular path for the ex-
change rate that is consistent with that 
inﬂation rate. By choosing a path for the
exchange rate (and money growth) consis-
tent with a low inﬂation rate, the Bank of
Mexico could use a pegged exchange rate
as a tool to help lower the inﬂation rate.
9 Data taken from Gil-Diaz and
Carstens (1995).
10See Dornbusch and Werner
(1994) and Hufbauer and
Schott (1993).
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Table 1
Mexican Consumption, Savings, Output, and Inﬂation
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Total Consumption* 89.3 91.4 90.5 89.2 90.7 92.8 93.5 95.9
Private Consumption 78.8 81.3 80.8 79.8 80.6 81.4 81.2 82.3
Public Consumption 10.5 10.1 9.7 9.5 10.1 11.4 12.3 13.6
Total Saving* 10.7 8.6 9.5 10.8 9.3 7.2 6.5 4.1
Private Saving NA 7.8 7.5 6.6 5.1 3.8 NA NA
Public Saving NA 0.8 2.0 4.2 4.2 3.5 NA NA
Real GDP Growth 0.0 1.3 3.3 20.9 9.3 2.8 0.4 3.8
Inﬂation (CPI) 159.2 51.7 19.7 29.9 18.8 11.9 8.0 7.1
* Table entries are expressed as a percentage of National Disposable Income.
Source: OCED National Accounts and DRIINTL.There are three ways in which a 
pegged exchange rate policy helped the
ﬁght against inﬂation. First, a stronger 
peso forced Mexican producers of tradeable
goods to restrain price increases to directly
compete with foreign producers. Second,
in every disinﬂation, the credibility of the
disinﬂation is important to breaking the
momentum of the inﬂation with little cost
in lost output. That is, people have to be
convinced that inﬂation will fall. A pegged
exchange rate helps break inﬂationary ex-
pectations by providing a concrete measure
of the progress in ﬁghting inﬂation; it 
gives the public an inﬂation-sensitive nomi-
nal anchor. People can see that the cur-
rency doesn’t free fall against a (low inﬂa-
tion) foreign currency and so they come to
believe that inﬂation is falling. Third,
maintaining the exchange rate against the
dollar gives the monetary authority instant
feedback as to the pressure on the value of
the peso.
The danger with using a pegged ex-
change rate to ﬁght inﬂation is that the real
exchange rate will become overvalued if 
domestic inﬂation exceeds the rate of depre-
ciation of the domestic currency plus for-
eign inﬂation. Pegging the nominal ex-
change rate while domestic inﬂation
exceeds foreign inﬂation raises the real ex-
change rate, and domestic goods become
more expensive in terms of foreign goods.
This ﬁghts domestic inﬂation for the rea-
sons outlined previously, but at the cost 
of making domestic industries less com-
petitive in tradeable goods. Such a situa-
tion may quickly become unsustain-
able.
Despite this danger, many developing
countries with histories of high inﬂation
have used restrictive monetary policy with
a pegged (or crawling peg) exchange rate
to control inﬂation. That is the course
Mexico chose; from 1988 to 1994, the
Bank of Mexico used the exchange rate as
an instrument to bring down inﬂation.
The peso was pegged to the dollar in
March 1988. In January 1989, the peg was
changed to a crawling peg and a moving
target zone was introduced in December
1991.
11 The lower limit of the target zone
or band was lowered (devalued) only
slowly. The principle of controlling the ex-
change rate to restrain inﬂation remained
the same, however.
As the preceding section concluded, it
was not obvious that the peso was over-
valued. To the extent that it may have
been, however, creating an overvalued ex-
change rate by using a pegged exchange
rate to bring down inﬂation is neither
new nor unique to Mexico. Numerous au-
thors, including Corbo and De Melo
(1987), have commented on the tendency
toward overvaluation in the so-called
“Southern Cone” countries of Argentina,
Chile and Uruguay when the exchange
rate is used as an instrument to reduce
inﬂation. Gil-Diaz and Carstens (1995)
add Brazil and Finland to this list of
countries that experienced overvaluation.
In all of these countries, there was sub-
stantial real overvaluation but no free
trade agreement to blame for it.
Other Reasons to Avoid Devaluation.Ve-
lasco (1995) discusses several reasons why
the Mexican authorities wished to avoid de-
valuation in 1994. First, they did not wish to
lose the gains they had made against inﬂa-
tion. Aside from the domestic consequences
of loss of control of inﬂation, the Mexican
authorities feared that a devaluation would
be ineffective in changing the relative price
of Mexican and foreign goods if inﬂation
would outpace the depreciation of the peso.
Such a devaluation would have been the
worst of both worlds: more inﬂation, a loss
of credibility and no improvement in the
competitiveness of domestic goods. Further,
to maintain their credibility with investors,
the Mexican policymakers were reluctant to
devalue even in the face of large shocks.
They were concerned that devaluation
would call into question the policymakers’
commitment to other reforms and result in a
loss of foreign investment.
Summary on the Value of the Peso.In
1993–1994 Dornbusch and Werner pre-
sented evidence, convincing in retrospect,
that the peso was overvalued. It was not
clear at the time, however, that this was the
11A crawling peg is a pre-
announced daily rate of slow
devaluation. In the target zone
system, Mexican authorities
pledged to keep the exchange
rate with the dollar within
given margins.
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overvalued, it was because of the disinﬂa-
tion strategy pursued by Mexico, and other
policy concerns. The evidence is not consis-
tent with the claim that the government of
Mexico deliberately manipulated the value
of the peso and planned a devaluation 
years in advance or that the authorities
avoided a faster rate of depreciation solely





This section introduces the concept of
capital ﬂows, lays out the hypothesis that
NAFTA was responsible for the peso crisis
by stimulating capital ﬂows out of Mexico,
and then shows that the evidence is not
consistent with this hypothesis.
What Are Capital Flows?
Capital ﬂows entail the buying and
selling of existing assets. When foreign in-
vestors buy real or ﬁnancial Mexican as-
sets, for example, capital ﬂows into Mex-
ico. Real assets include factories and real
estate; ﬁnancial assets encompass bonds
and equity. Foreign investment is divided
into foreign direct investment (FDI) and
portfolio investment. FDI is distinguished
from portfolio investment by active con-
trol of the assets: Buying a factory is FDI,
buying a bond is portfolio investment.
The national income accounts measure
net capital ﬂows by the balance in the cap-
ital account. A surplus in a nation’s capital
account means that more capital is ﬂowing
into the country than is ﬂowing out; that
is, the country is selling more existing as-
sets than it is buying. Similarly, the current
account measures trade in goods and ser-
vices, net receipts on foreign investment,
and unilateral transfers. A current account
deﬁcit means that a country is importing
more newly produced goods and services
than it exports.
Aside from measurement errors, the
current account balance must be equal and
opposite to the capital account balance be-
cause a country can import more than it
exports only by selling foreigners claims
on existing real or ﬁnancial assets.
12 Thus
a deﬁcit in the current account must be
balanced by an equal and opposite capital
account surplus because the two accounts
are the opposite sides of the same transac-
tion. One measures the net value of the
goods and services received, and the other
measures the net value of the assets ex-
changed for the goods and services. A na-
tion that runs a current account deﬁcit
(and, by deﬁnition, a capital account sur-
plus) is borrowing from abroad, selling as-
sets like bonds in exchange for new goods
and services. A country running a current
account surplus is lending to other coun-
tries by buying assets in exchange for ex-
ports of goods and services. In a world
with balanced trade, there would be no
opportunities for net international borrow-
ing, and domestic savings would have to
equal domestic investment.
Figure 4 illustrates that Mexico ran in-
creasing current account deﬁcits and capi-
tal account surpluses for the period
1990–1994. In other words, it was increas-
ingly borrowing from abroad—as much as
8 percent of its GDP by 1993. Capital in-
ﬂows—a capital account surplus—are use-
ful because they permit a nation to con-
sume more and grow faster by borrowing
12The accumulation or loss of of-
ﬁcial reserves like foreign ex-
change, gold, or other assets
permits an exception to the
rule that the current and capital
accounts must balance. A na-
tion can temporarily ﬁnance a
current account deﬁcit by sell-
ing off ofﬁcial assets, as Mex-
ico did in 1994. This simply
amounts to a change in the
way that the capital account is
deﬁned.
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Figure 4
Current Account and Capital Account
Balances as a Percentage of GDP
Year










Accountagainst future income. The sustainability
of capital inﬂows (borrowing) is limited by
the capacity of the borrower to pay back
the loan. Borrowing for present consump-
tion is not sustainable unless national in-
come, or the capacity to pay back the 
loan, grows rapidly. Borrowing to invest 
in productive capacity, borrowing that 
increases future income or reduces future
expenditures is more likely to be sustain-
able. Judging whether capital ﬂows are
sustainable is difﬁcult, however, because
consumption and investment are deﬁned
and measured imperfectly. For example,
spending on education, health care, or
consumer durables is counted in the na-
tional accounts as consumption, but per-
haps it should be called investment.
The Case that NAFTA Was 
Responsible for Capital Flows 
that Caused the Peso Crisis
The immediate precipitating factor in
the Mexican peso crisis of December 1994
was the desire of investors to get their as-
sets, especially portfolio investment, out 
of pesos, which they feared would be 
devalued, and into dollars or other foreign
currency. That is, capital was ﬂowing out
of Mexico. This section lays out the logic
behind the critics’ second hypothesis
about NAFTA and the Mexican ﬁnancial
crisis—that NAFTA drove international
capital ﬂows that led to the devaluation of
the peso. There are also two versions of
this hypothesis. The ﬁrst version requires
only that NAFTA simply encouraged 
capital inﬂows—either by depressing na-
tional savings or by making Mexico a
more attractive investment environment—
and that capital inﬂows, in the form of
portfolio investment, are inherently dan-
gerous. The second version suggests that
NAFTA generated political instability 
that sparked capital outﬂows and the 
devaluation. These hypotheses require
that: 
1. Either NAFTA encouraged international
capital inﬂows, which are intrinsically
destabilizing, or 
2. NAFTA triggered capital outflows that
led to the peso’s devaluation by creat-
ing political instability.
The Case that NAFTA Generated Capital
Inﬂows. The capital inﬂows to Mexico
(Mexico’s capital account surplus) in
1990–1994 meant that Mexico was bor-
rowing from abroad to ﬁnance its current
account deﬁcit. A low savings rate made
Mexico more dependent on international
capital ﬂows and therefore more vulnera-
ble to shocks.
13 Critics contend that this
dependence was critically worsened by
passage of NAFTA. There are two ways in
which NAFTA might generate capital in-
ﬂows to Mexico. The ﬁrst is by decreasing
Mexican national savings. The second is
by increasing the desirability of investment
in Mexico.
Why might NAFTA reduce Mexico’s
savings rate? First, by directly lowering
trade barriers, NAFTA made consumption
of imports, especially consumer durables,
cheaper and more attractive relative to sav-
ing. Given Mexico’s history of protection-
ism, consumers may have feared that free
trade was temporary and wished to buy
while they could. A rise in the consump-
tion rate must lower the savings rate be-
cause all disposable income of a nation or
an individual can be classiﬁed as either
consumption or savings. Second, NAFTA
and other economic reforms may have in-
creased expectations of future income, in-
creasing Mexicans’ willingness to go into
debt and lenders willingness to permit
this.14 At the same time, ﬁnancial reforms
gave ordinary people greater access to
credit markets and thus greater ability to
go into debt. Finally, if NAFTA con-
tributed to an artiﬁcially higher real value
of the peso, that would have also made
imported goods much less expensive and
consumption more attractive.
“... NAFTA served as a kind of
‘Good Housekeeping Seal of Ap-
proval’ that encouraged even more
investors into Mexico.” 
Anderson, Cavanagh and Ranney
(1996), p. 3.
13A savings rate and a consump-
tion rate are savings and con-
sumption, respectively, as per-
centages of income.
14The Permanent Income Hypoth-
esis, developed by economist
Milton Friedman (1957), pre-
dicts that people base their
consumption on their lifetime
income. That is, they smooth
their consumption over time by
borrowing during periods of
low income and saving during
periods of high income.
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hypothesis suggests that NAFTA may have
generated capital inﬂows to Mexico by mak-
ing Mexico a more attractive investment en-
vironment. This hypothesis would explain
the surge, in early 1994, of capital inﬂows
that caused the peso to appreciate. NAFTA
was considered especially important to in-
vestors because an international treaty 
made the reforms more likely to be perma-
nent. There is considerable reluctance 
to break a treaty with a foreign govern-
ment.
An implicit assumption of the hypothe-
sis that NAFTA was responsible for the peso
crisis because it encouraged capital inﬂows
is that such ﬂows are inherently destabiliz-
ing. Portfolio investment, in particular, was
frequently maligned as being a cause of the
crisis. It was said to be moved on a whim
with a short-term investment horizon, cre-
ating ﬁnancial market volatility. Such a view
requires that international capital markets
be subject to fads or speculative bubbles.
Critics point to the volatility of the dollar in
the 1980s, the European Exchange Rate
Mechanism crises of 1992 and 1993, and the
recent ﬂood of capital into emerging mar-
kets as evidence of this.
The Case that NAFTA Contributed to Cap-
ital Outﬂows Through Political Instability.
From the Mexican view, the purpose of
NAFTA was to create a more prosperous
and stable Mexico. Nevertheless, even good
economic policy can unintentionally create
dislocations and political instability. Some
have charged that NAFTA contributed to
the Chiapas uprising that triggered the 
capital outﬂows that brought down the
peso.
“On January 1, 1994—the day
that the North American Free-
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) took
effect, binding Mexico’s moderniz-
ing economy to that of the United
States—Indian peasants at the
southern end of the country rose
in armed rebellion. ... Many in
Chiapas fear that NAFTA will
worsen the existing divide be-
tween Mexico’s prosperous north
and an impoverished south.” 
The Economist, January 8, 1994.
The uprising was soon contained by
the Mexican army, but it and other political
shocks concerned investors throughout the
year. They engendered fears that the eco-
nomic reforms in Mexico had moved too
fast and would lead to social unrest that
would roll back the reforms. In fact, the ini-
tial devaluation on December 20, 1994, was
sparked by a run on the peso started by ru-
mors of renewed ﬁghting in Chiapas.
15
These political shocks led investors to
exchange pesos for dollars at the Bank of
Mexico, causing a series of falls in Mexico’s
foreign exchange reserves, limiting its
short-term ability to defend the peso.
16 Fig-
ure 3 illustrates the stepwise falls in foreign
exchange reserves during 1994. By the time
that rumors of renewed ﬁghting rattled the
markets on December 19, 1994, the Bank
of Mexico had nearly run out of foreign ex-
change reserves. Without foreign exchange
to defend the peso, the Bank of Mexico had
to devalue.
17 Critics of NAFTA might argue
that the treaty caused the peso crisis by
sparking the Chiapas uprising.
Evaluating the Evidence on NAFTA
and Capital Flows
This section evaluates the evidence on
NAFTA and capital ﬂows to see whether it
is consistent with either of the hypotheses
that NAFTA caused the peso crisis through
its effect on capital ﬂows. The ﬁrst subsec-
tion examines the evidence on the extent
to which NAFTA encouraged capital in-
ﬂows and the next looks at the argument
that capital ﬂows are inherently destabiliz-
ing. Finally, the role of NAFTA in the Chi-
apas uprising and political instability is ap-
praised.
Evidence on NAFTA and Capital Inﬂows.
Mexico did indeed have low and falling na-
tional savings rates—4 percent of GDP in
1994, for example (see Table 1)—making it
more dependent on international capital
ﬂows. Net savings fell from 10.8 percent of
15See Gil-Diaz and Carstens
(1995) or IMF (1995) for the
details of the decision to de-
value.
16In the long run, the Bank of
Mexico used its control over
the money supply to determine
the foreign exchange value of
the peso. Over the short term,
however, the Bank of Mexico
defended the value of the peso
by buying and selling pesos for
dollars. By itself, this action
would reduce the supply of
pesos and push up Mexican in-
terest rates. The Bank of Mex-
ico, however, fully sterilized
the purchase of pesos by buy-
ing outstanding bonds in ex-
change for pesos, putting the
pesos back into circulation.
Sterilization is intended to
leave domestic interest rates
unchanged after foreign ex-
change purchases or sales.
17Some suggest that the Bank of
Mexico could have used its
control over the domestic
money supply to defend the
peso, but it was reluctant to do
this because of the effect high
interest rates would have had
on the real economy and the
banking sector. Certainly by 
December 1994 this strategy
would have imposed large
costs.
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1994.
18 This reduction in savings was dri-
ven by corresponding increases in private
and government consumption, which rose
2.5 percentage points and 4.1 percentage
points, respectively, over the same period. 
There are several problems with the
hypothesis that the declining savings was a
result of NAFTA. First, it is not very plau-
sible that NAFTA would cause a large rise
in private (or government) consumption.
Trade barriers cause consumers to substi-
tute one form or source of consumption
for another but change aggregate levels of
consumption/saving relatively little. Thus
the effect of trade liberalization on trade
deﬁcits is not likely to be very big. Also,
the fact that most of the increase in con-
sumption was caused by a rise in govern-
ment consumption does not ﬁt well with
the hypothesis that NAFTA caused the fall
in savings. The sluggish economy in 1993
and election year politics in 1994 were
more likely than NAFTA to have played a
role in this relaxation of ﬁscal policy. Fi-
nally, the timing of the inﬂows is wrong;
the inﬂows started in 1990 with the reso-
lution of the debt crisis and the liberaliza-
tion of capital account rules to permit for-
eigners to hold government bonds and
nonvoting equity shares in Mexican
ﬁrms.
19 Figure 4 illustrates this rise in the
capital account surplus; the majority of
capital inﬂows had entered Mexico well
before NAFTA was negotiated, much less
enacted. Other economic reforms, like the
decline in inﬂation and the privatization of
state-owned industries, also helped drive
investment.
While NAFTA was not the only or
even the major causal factor for capital
inﬂows, it probably had some marginal 
effect. Figure 4 shows that Mexico’s capi-
tal account surplus did peak in the ﬁrst
quarter of 1994, coinciding with the im-
plementation of NAFTA. The ﬁgure is
somewhat deceptive in that a surge in 
inﬂows in January 1994 and February
1994 was masked in the quarterly capital
account ﬁgures by a major outﬂow in
March after the assassination of presiden-
tial candidate Luis Donaldo Colosio. 
Part of the capital inﬂow was soaked up
in the form of a rapid increase and then
decrease in ofﬁcial reserves—shown by
the spike in Figure 3 at the beginning 
of 1994. That is, the Bank of Mexico
bought up dollars in sterilized intervention
to keep the price of the peso down in 
January and February 1994. The surge 
was not out of proportion to earlier ﬂows,
however.
To the extent that private Mexican
consumption increased in the early 1990s,
there are many factors aside from NAFTA
to explain it. Prolonged slow growth
(since 1980) had created repressed con-
sumer demand. After growth returned in
1988, consumption spending rose along
with it. Also, to the limited extent that re-
ducing trade barriers may change savings
and consumption decisions, NAFTA was
not the only trade initiative. Mexico en-
gaged in unilateral trade liberalization and
trade agreements with Chile, Colombia,
Venezuela, and Costa Rica. Similar to
other developing countries, economic re-
form and ﬁnancial liberalization—quite
apart from NAFTA—raised expectations of
increased future income and gave more
Mexicans access to credit.
To summarize: the evidence does 
not support the argument that NAFTA
drove large capital inﬂows to Mexico.
NAFTA did increase foreign conﬁdence
and marginally increased capital inﬂows,
but most capital inﬂows had entered before
passage of NAFTA. In fact, NAFTA may
have delayed a crisis by drawing in capital
that supported the peso in early 1994.
Volatility of Capital Flows. The question
of whether capital ﬂows are excessively
volatile or inherently destabilizing is difﬁ-
cult to answer because capital should exit
a country in response to poor economic
policies or other factors that reduce its
productivity. This helps ensure that capital
is as productive as possible and provides
governments with an immediate incentive
to maintain sound policies. On the other
hand, it is possible that portfolio invest-
ment overreacts to information, and this
volatility does create problems.
18Data from OECD (1995) Na-
tional Accounts.
19See Sachs, Tornell and Velasco
(1995a and 1995b).
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of weak currencies in moments of crisis
and these movements can be destabilizing,
some economists have advocated a very
small tax on international ﬁnancial trans-
actions to deter short-term speculation.
20
Trying to eliminate international capital
ﬂows would be a mistake, however, be-
cause capital inﬂows can be quite helpful
in promoting development. Also, they are
not necessarily destabilizing. Rather, their
volatility can depend on the soundness of
macroeconomic policies followed in the
recipient countries. Further, outﬂows
occur without regard to the nationality of
the investors in the presence of unsound
macroeconomic policies. Domestic resi-
dents would get their money out of the
domestic assets under the same conditions
as international investors, if the value of
these assets were threatened.
NAFTA and the Chiapas Uprising.
NAFTA may have been a catalyst for, but
certainly was not the cause of, the Chiapas
uprising. This rebellion reﬂected griev-
ances long and deeply felt by the impover-
ished south against the more prosperous
north. Also, the uprising was only one 
political shock among many that Mexico
endured that year, including two major 
assassinations, a rise in U.S. interest rates
and a presidential election. If the Decem-
ber Chiapas uprising had not sparked the
crisis, something else likely would have.
Capital Flows to Emerging Markets. Mex-
ico is not the only developing country to
experience heavy capital inﬂows recently.
In the last 10 years capital inﬂows to de-
veloping countries have increased sharply
because of two factors: market-oriented
policy reforms and low interest rates pre-
vailing in the developed world. These fac-
tors draw in capital because policy reforms
raise the return to investment in develop-
ing countries and the low interest rates in
the developed world provide a less attrac-
tive alternative for international investors.
For developing countries, capital ﬂows
provide a much needed source of funds for
economic growth. Ideally, international
capital ﬂows provide major advantages for
both investors and recipients.
This movement of assets can also
cause difﬁculties, however. Corbo and
Hernandez (1996) studied the problems
posed by this movement of assets in nine
countries: Argentina, Chile, Columbia, In-
donesia, Malaysia, Mexico, the Philip-
pines, South Korea, and Thailand. They re-
port that though the absolute level of
investment in Mexico from 1986 to 1993
was very large compared with the other
countries, Thailand, Malaysia, and Chile
received larger capital inﬂows as a percent-
age of GDP than did Mexico. Many of
these countries have also encountered
problems similar to those confronted by
the Mexican authorities. For example, in
regimes with ﬁxed or predetermined ex-
change rates, capital inﬂows can lower do-
mestic interest rates, raise domestic expen-
ditures and temporarily raise inﬂation,
which can lead to an overvalued currency
and large trade deﬁcits.
Partly to offset the tendency toward
overvaluation caused by the capital ﬂows,
all of these countries have undertaken lib-
eralization of trade, though none of them
has concluded a trade agreement compara-
ble in importance to NAFTA. But free
trade agreements are not necessary to cre-
ate substantial capital inﬂows. The breadth
and size of these capital ﬂows to reforming
countries in the developing world in the
last 10 years makes it difﬁcult to believe
that NAFTA was the primary reason for
the inﬂows to Mexico.
Capital ﬂow volatility poses particular
problems for ﬁxed exchange rate regimes
because capital outﬂows are synonymous
with exchange rate crises. Investors who
perceive a possibility of a discrete fall in
the value of their assets (that is, a devalu-
ation), will attempt to get their money out
of the weak currency. Thus crises appear
suddenly when capital is easily moved.
These outﬂows are merely a symptom of
the problem, however, not the cause.
Summary of the Evidence on NAFTA and
Capital Flows. NAFTA is an unlikely cul-
prit to blame for the quantity of capital in-
20See Frankel (1996) for a short
discussion of the Tobin tax.
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The surge in capital ﬂows started well be-
fore the enactment of NAFTA and had
more to do with the rise in consumption
by the Mexican government and the other
economic reforms undertaken.
Whatever the source or timing of the
inﬂows, however, NAFTA was not respon-
sible for the outﬂows. It is generally ac-
knowledged that the outﬂows were gener-
ated by some combination of inconsistent
policies and political shocks that generated
a liquidity crisis; the Mexican government
had more short-term obligations—in the
form of dollar-linked bonds—coming due
than it had liquid assets.
21
CONCLUSION
As Mexico entered into NAFTA at the
beginning of 1994, it was widely and cor-
rectly applauded as a model of economic re-
form. Before the end of the year, however, it
was forced to ﬁrst devalue and later to allow
the peso to ﬂoat. In early 1995, it was forced
to borrow from the IMF and the United
States to get through a liquidity crisis.
Critics of NAFTA such as Ross Perot,
Pat Buchanan, William Greider, and
Robert Kuttner blamed the trade treaty
for this crisis. This article examines two
versions of this argument: that Mexican
policymakers manipulated the value of
the peso because of NAFTA and that
NAFTA caused volatile international capi-
tal ﬂows that brought down the peso.
The evidence does not support the hy-
pothesis that the crisis could have re-
sulted from NAFTA’s economic effects.
Any peso overvaluation in 1994 resulted
from the use of the exchange rate to re-
duce inﬂation, a common consequence of
this strategy. Although capital inﬂows can
present problems and aggravate instability
in developing countries, they are also
very useful to promote economic devel-
opment. In any case, the ﬂows to Mexico
were only partially driven by NAFTA.
NAFTA was not, in any sense, responsi-
ble for the devaluation, but this episode
reminds us that good policies can have
unintended consequences.
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